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White Knights and Black Knights
– Does the Search for Competitive Bids always Benefit 
the Shareholders of “Target” Companies? –
by
Federico M. Mucciarelli*
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should
be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent
board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”.
The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always 
benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing
that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s 
shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit
for them. 
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I. Defending the besieged castle
According to the EC Directive, which was approved at the end of 2003 after
a lengthy debate1, the board of the “target” company should remain passive
in front of a takeover-bid2. More precisely, Article 9 of the Directive, which
follows the model of the City Code on takeovers and mergers of the London
Stock Exchange 3 and of many other European legal systems, provides that
“the board of the offeree company shall obtain the prior authorisation of 
the general meeting of shareholders given for this purpose before taking any
action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in the frustration
of the bid” 4. 
Therefore, defensive measures are not forbidden, on the contrary they are 
allowed if they are expressly authorised by the shareholders. Put in another
way, the general meeting of a listed company is competent to authorise meas-
ures which can obstacle the choice of shareholders on whether to tender or
not, this means on decisions which could indirectly influence the ownership
of the company.
The board of the target company can nevertheless seek a competing bid 
without being authorised by the general meeting 5 even if this can frustrate the
first takeover-bid. This rule meets a wide acceptance, being applied by most
Member States; similarly, Delaware case law, which does not give to the gen-
eral meeting the competence on defensive measures, requires the target’s 
board to promote an auction when the sale or the break-up of the company
becomes unavoidable6. 
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1 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21st April 2004
on takeover bids. OJEU, 30. 4. 2004, L 142/12, cf. Edwards, “The Directive on Takeover
Bids – not worth the paper it’s written on?”, ECFR (2004) 416.
2 This “passivity” or “neutrality” rule was nonetheless weakened by an “opt-out” option
given to the Member States by the Directive itself: Article 12.
3 City Code on Takeover and Mergers, General principle n. 7: “At no time, after a bona
fide offer has been communicated to the board of the offeree company, or after the board
of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent,
may any action be taken by the board of the offeree company in relation to the affairs of
the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting, which could
effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders of the 
offeree company being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits.”
4 Article 9 (2).
5 In the following text I will call this rule for simplicity “white knight exception”.
6 Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Super 1985), 182;
City Capital v. Interco, 551 A.2d, 787 (Del. Ch. 1st November 1988) ; Paramount com-
munications inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del., 24th July 1989).
If we admit that during a takeover contest, the board of the target company
should pursue only, or at least mainly, shareholder’s interests, the “white
knight exception” should be praised, because in this way the board puts the
shares up for auction, enhancing shareholders wealth. 
I will nonetheless argue that this exception could be unfair for shareholders’
interests. After the launch of a takeover bid, shareholders face collective 
action problems, which compel them to tender even though this is not in
their collective best interest (so-called pressure to tender). Competing bids
could be coercive as well, forcing shareholders to tender even if the bid 
launched at first is more convenient; hence, seeking a coercive competing 
takeover-bid does not fit the rationale underpinning the “white knight ex-
ception”.
The work will proceed as follows. In the second section I will briefly summa-
rise the issue of collective action problems related to takeover bids. In the
third section I will describe the arguments supporting the case for seeking a
competitive bid by the incumbent board without being authorised by the 
general meeting. In the forth section I will discuss some examples of coercive
competing takeover bids; I will argue that if the competitive bid raises collec-
tive action problems this is neither efficient nor coherent with the ratio legis
of the Directive, admitting the incumbent board to seek a white knight 
without being authorised by the general meeting.
II. The shareholder in his labyrinth
1. The general issue
Any decision of target shareholders on the merit of an offer is affected by
collective action problems 7, as it happens in every case when more persons
should take individually a decision on a certain problem without having 
the ability to coordinate among themselves and the utility of each person 
depends on the choices made by the others. In case of takeover-bids share-
holders should choose whether to sell their shares to the offeror or to hold
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7 The following arguments are based on the assumption that shareholders behave ration-
ally in order to maximise their utility. I assume that a person acts rationally if she acts in
the best way in order to reach a specific goal and her preferences are transitive.
Preferences are transitive in this case: if some good “A” is preferred to a good “B”, 
and this latter good “B” is preferred by the same person to a good “C”, then should 
follow that also “A” is preferred to “C”. (Putting it in a formal way, we write it as follow:
A  B c B  C → A  C.) See Ulen, “Rational choice theory in law and economics”, in
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, http://encyclo.find.law.com, 790.
them. Thus, after a takeover bid is launched, shareholders compare the price
of the bid with the expected value of minority shares if the bid succeeds. But
a shareholder can not know what other fellow shareholders are going to 
decide on the merit of the offer, and coordination among them is too costly
and almost impossible. We can distinguish two cases indeed.
2. Free-riding
If the expected value of minority shares under the new controlling share-
holders is considered by the majority of shareholders as higher than the value
under the incumbent shareholders, then it is rational for shareholders to hold
their shares, hoping that other shareholders will sell them. 
The success of the bid is not impeded by the fact that a minority of share-
holders, or even only one of them, did not sell their shares 8. If every share-
holder behaves in this way, however, none of them will tender, hoping that
fellow shareholders will sell their shares. If this happens, a value-increasing
takeover-bid is going to fail 9. 
3. Pressure to tender
If the expected value of minority shares after a successful bid is presumed to
be lower than the price offered, shareholders are forced to sell, although 
under an ex post point of view this is not the best choice for them (so-called
pressure to tender); in this case a value-decreasing takeover bid is going to
succeed 10. 
Indeed, shareholders do not know whether other shareholders will tender
their shares or not and they cannot coordinate their behaviour among each
other. If the bid succeeds shareholders risk to lose the price of the offer, 
bearing only under-priced minority shares; hence, the decision to tender is
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8 Goshen, “Voting (insincerely) in Corporate Law”, 2 Theoretical Inq. L. (2001) 815.
9 Grossman – Hart, “Takeover bids, the free-rider problem and the theory of the corpo-
ration”, 11 Bell Journal of Economics (1980) 42.
10 Bebchuk, “Toward undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers”, 
98 Harv. L. Rev. (1985) 1693 and “The pressure to tender: an analysis and proposed 
remedy”, 12 Delaware Journal Corp. Law (1987) 926. On a side note, it is woth 
mentioning that the German companies’ group law provisions, in particluar on domin-
ion agreements, that have often been criticised as overcomplicated, mitigate the value
decreasing problem and compensate the loss of the minority shareholder, §§ 304, 305
Aktiengesetz [AktG]. On group law, cf. further the article by Girgado in this issue.
dominant. Of course, the choice made by shareholders depends on how the
bid is likely to be successful: the more shareholders hold for likely that the
bid succeeds, the more they are coerced to sell their shares.
a) Partial and “two-tiered” bids
Law and economics theory suggests that partial and “two-tier” offers place
on shareholders the biggest pressure to tender.
– Partial bids. After the bid has succeeded, tendering shareholders hold only
an average value among the price offered and the value of the minority 
shares under the new management11. Therefore, shareholders would be
better-off if they could coordinate themselves not selling their shares. Since
any sort of coordination is too expensive, the optimal strategy for share-
holders, under an ex ante point of view, is to tender12. 
– “Two-tiered” bids. The offeror launches a first partial “front-end” offer at
a high price, promising to launch a second “back-end” bid for the rest 
of the shares at a lower price. For shareholders this situation is similar to
the one faced when a partial offer is launched, the “back-end” price being 
comparable with the expected value of the minority share if the partial 
offer succeeds 13. Shareholders will rationally tender, fearing to gain only
the lower “back-end” price. 
The difference between the “front-end” and the “back-end” price is of great
relevance on shareholder’s choices: the greater this difference is, the greater is
the potential loss for non-tendering shareholders and the more shareholders
are forced to tender14.
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11 The value depends on the amount of shares which the offeror is keen to purchase
through the bid, and the number of tendered shares.
12 If shareholders sell, they lose the difference between the offered price and the lower 
value of minority share they will hold after the bid succeeds.
13 Brudney – Chirelstein, “Fair shares in corporate mergers and takeovers”, 88 Harvard
Law Journ. (1974) 297; Subramanian, “A new takeover defense mechanism: using an
equal treatment agreement as an alternative to the poison pill”, 23 Del. Journ. Corp.
Law. (1998) 402; Mülbert – Birke, “In defense of passivity – on the proper role of a 
target’s management in response to a hostile tender offer”, 1 EBOR (2000) 468. 
See also Delaware Supreme Court Paramount (n. 6) at HN7 “In a two-tier, highly 
coercive tender offer, the threat is obvious: shareholders may be compelled to tender to
avoid being treated adversely in the second stage of the transaction”.
14 Bradley – Kim, “The evolution of the tender offer as a takeover device: an analysis of
ownership structure, the free rider problem, and the prisoner’s dilemma”, unpublished,
(1984) 295; Oesterle, “The negotiation model of tender offer defences and the Delaware
Supreme Court”, 72 Cornell L. Rev. (1986), 127.
“Two-tier” and partial bids could allocate resources in an inefficient way. We
can make the following example in order to understand this point. Let us 
assume that a potential target has 10 outstanding shares, each one worth 50 €;
this means that the market value of the firm is 500 €. Let us now assume that
an offeror launches a “two-tier” bid shaped as follows: a first “front-end” bid
for 5 shares at 60 €, and a second, “back-end” bid for the remaining 5 shares
at 20 € each. The offer is conditioned upon the tendering of 5 shares. Rational
shareholders, fearing to get only the low “back-end” price, will tender and
the bid will therefore succeed. If the value of the firm under the new majority
is less then 500 €, then the bid should be considered as value-decreasing, be-
cause the offeror is keen to pay only 400 € for a firm which was worth 500 €,
without diminishing the value of the firm itself.
b) The mandatory bid rule
In order to limit partial and “two-tier” bids, the Directive introduces at a EU
level the “mandatory bid rule”, providing that any persons, who purchases
the control of a listed company15, should launch a takeover bid on 100 % of
shares carrying voting right at the higher price paid for shares over a period
between 6 and 12 months before the bid. 
Therefore, partial bids are not forbidden at EU level, they are rather more
difficult to be used for taking over a company, as a partial bid should be 
always followed by a 100 % bid for the outstanding shares at the same price. 
In a world with the mandatory bid rule in place the game is similar to the one
described for “two-tier” offers, where the mandatory bid following a partial
bid can be compared with the “back-end” bid. Therefore, the pressure to 
tender placed on shareholders depends on the price of the mandatory bid: 
if this is lower than the price of the partial bid, shareholders could face a 
pressure to tender similar to the one placed by “two-tier” offers. 
Applying the result reached before on “two-tier” bids, we can say that the
greater is the difference between the price paid for crossing the relevant thresh-
old and the price of the mandatory bid, the greater is the pressure on share-
holder to tender to a partial bid. But as we have seen, according to the EC 
Directive, mandatory bids should be launched at the higher price paid by the
offeror for crossing the threshold; hence the Directive eliminates the most 
relevant collective action problems placed by partial bids.
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15 More precisely: a threshold which let presume having the control, according to the law
of the Member State where the target company has her registered office. Article 4.
Member States can, nonetheless, give their supervisory authority the power
to derogate to the higher price rule, allowing launching a mandatory bid at a
lower price, in extraordinary cases where the higher price paid for crossing
the relevant threshold is unsound 16. The Directive does not harmonise this 
issue, which is left to the regulation of each Member State. We could, there-
fore, expect having 25 different laws on the price of the mandatory bid17.
c) 100 % all-cash takeover-bids
But even 100 % all-cash takeover-bids can place a pressure to tender on 
shareholders.
As we have seen before, in case of a value-decreasing bid, shareholders would
be better-off if they could collectively decide not to tender. In this case a 
value-decreasing bid would be defeated18. Shareholders cannot coordinate
themselves and they do not know whether fellow shareholder will tender or
not tender. Shareholders compare the risk of holding minority undervalued
shares, in case of success of the bid, with the price of the offer, hence the 
optimal ex ante strategy is to tender.
If the offeror has a duty to purchase all non-tendered shares at the same price
of the bid or to extend the offer period after the bid succeeds 19, we could 
argue that the bid does not place on shareholders any pressure to tender. In
these cases non tendering shareholders do not risk to hold minority under-
valued shares after the bid succeeds, therefore they are free to reject the offer
if they do not hold it as convenient20. 
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16 Article 5 (4).
17 Enriques, “The mandatory bid rule in the takeover directive: harmonization without
foundation?”, ECFR (2004) 446.
18 Bebchuk, “Efficient and inefficient sales of control”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
(1994), 957 et seq.
19 Such a duty could rest either on a clause of the bid itself, or on the law, as it is the case
in some EU Member States. See: London City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rule
31.4; German WpÜG, § 16 (2); Austrian ÜbG, § 19 (3); Swiss ÜV-ÖK, Article 27 (2),
providing that succeeding bids should be left open for two weeks after their end. Of
course, in this way takeover bids are more expensive and therefore rather infrequent.
20 Gilson – Kraakman, “Delaware’s intermediate standard for defensive tactics: Is there
substance to proportionality review?”, 44 Bus. Lawyer (1988) 254.
III. Seeking a white knight
The general meeting is competent on decisions which could indirectly influ-
ence the composition of share ownership21; the board can nevertheless seek a
competing bid without the need to be authorised by shareholders. 
The goal of this “white knight exception” seems clear. An auction on target
shares pursues shareholders’ interests; hence it is not necessary to attribute to
the competence of the general meeting the decision to seek for a potential
bidder and to transfer to him any useful information. 
In order to understand the rationale lying behind of the “white knight excep-
tion” we can imagine a world where there is a “passivity rule” in place, but
the wording of the law does not provide for any exception to the competence
of the general meeting. This was the case, for instance, under German law 
before the Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG) on takeover
regulation22, and under Italian law even now23. We should nonetheless ask
ourselves whether seeking competing bids does really need being authorised
by the general meeting, as it were a common defensive measure, or not. The
answer should be for the negative if we assume that the board has a general
duty to maximise what shareholders earn selling their shares and that the
“passivity rule” is a logic consequence of this general duty24; hence, we can
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21 See Merkt, “Verhaltenspflichten des Vorstands der Zielgesellschaft bei feindlichen
Übernahmen”, 165 ZHR (2001) 249, which was related to a general “passivity duty” 
placed to the board in front of a takeover, but in a time where neither the EC nor 
the national (i.e. German) law provided for a competence of the general meeting on 
defensive measures.
22 Enacted in 20.12. 2001. The neutrality rule is stated in § 33 WpÜG. Under German law
before 2002, only a non binding acquisition codex provided for a general passivity rule;
most legal scholars held, nonetheless, that the board should stay passive in front of a 
takeover attempt, but could seek for a competing bid: Mertens, in Kölner Kommentar
zum Aktiengesetz (2nd edn. 1996) § 76 [26]; Hopt, “Aktionärskreis und Vorstands-
neutralität”, ZGR (1993) 547; Id., “Verhaltenspflichten des Vorstands der Zielgesell-
schaft bei feindlichen Übernahmen”, in FS Lutter (2000) 1383; Berrar – Schnorbus,
“Rückerwerb eigener Aktien und Übernahmerecht”, ZGR (2003) 101 et seq.
23 Testo Unico della finanza (TUF), 1998, Article 104. The Italian authority on capital
markets (CONSOB) addressed this issue in the case of the takeover-bid on Telecom’s
shares, stressing that even if the law spends formally no word relating the seeking of 
a white knight, this does not need being authorised by the general meeting; see
DAL/99039392, 18. 5.1999 on www.consob.it.
24 Hopt (n. 22) 558; Vella, “La nuova passivity rule nella disciplina italiana delle offerte
pubbliche d’acquisto: alla ricerca di un difficile equilibrio”, Banca Impresa Società
(2000) 169; Berrar – Schnorbus, (n.. 22) 101; Hirte, “Verteidigung gegen Übernahme-
angebote und Rechtschutz des Aktionärs gegen die Verteidigung”, ZGR (2002) 639; Id.,
argue that seeking competing takeover-bids is not covered by the rationale
underpinning the general passivity rule and that the board can put the shares
up for auction 25. 
If we make a step further on this line, we can infer that the main policy goal
underpinning the “white knight exception” is to maximise the revenue for
shareholders selling their shares, not necessarily the maximisation of social
wealth or the efficiency; we could nonetheless consider revenue maximisa-
tion of target’s shareholders as a proxy for the efficient allocation of share’s
ownership rights, as in this way the firm is sold to the bidder who is keen to
offer the higher price 26. 
IV. Black knights
In the former section I have shown the argument supporting the “white
knight exception”. In the next section I will point out that some defensive 
takeover-bids could be coercive, or more coercive than the first hostile bid. 
I will make firstly two examples which do not consider any specific set of 
rules.
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Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG (2003) § 33 [75], [96]; Merkt (n. 21) 249. Cf. on 
the question in whose interests the company is to be run Schall – Miles – Goulding,
“Promoting an Inclusive Approach on the Part of Directors: The UK and German 
Positions”, JCLS (2006) 299.
25 See the authors cited in the previous footnote, and adde: Bebchuk, “The case for 
facilitating competing tender offers”, 95 Harv. Law Rev. (1982) 1028; Id., “The case for
facilitating competing tender offers: a reply and extension”, 35 Stanford Law Rev.
(1982) 23; Gilson, “Seeking competitive bids versus pure passivity in tender offer 
defense”, 35 Stanford Law Rev. (1982), 24 et seq.
26 See for instance the Bebchuk’s model for efficiency in corporate transactions. Assume
that: Wn = Mn + Bn (where: Wv = total value of the firm under incumbent manage-
ment; Mv = stock capitalisation under incumbent management; Bv = private benefits of
control under incumbent management), and that: Wn = Mn + Bn (where: Wn = firm 
value after bid succeeds; Mn = stock capitalisation if bid succeeds; Bn = private benefits
of control of the new management), then a transfer of control is efficient if: Wv = Mv +
Bv ≤ Wn = Mn + Bn.
This model relies upon some values, which could be rebutted; for instance, we could: 
a) hold that the market value is not significant for establishing the “true” or “right” 
value of a firm; b) consider the private benefits of control as always negative on firm’s
value (on the contrary, in the Bebchuk’s model the higher is B, the higher is also W); 
c) consider the interests of other stakeholders, as employee or creditor, as relevant 
for assessing the efficiency of a transaction; see Coffee jr, “Regulating the market 
for corporate control: Analitical assessment of the tender offer’s role in corporate 
governance”, 84 Col. Law. Rev. (1984) 1145 et seq.
1. The power of “two-tiered” defensive bids 
We can begin depicting the following example, where a defensive “two-tiered”
bid is launched against a first 100% all-cash hostile takeover-bid.
The listed company A has 10 outstanding shares. B launches a 100 % cash 
takeover bid at a price P = 10 €, promising to extend the offer period at the
same price after the bid succeeds. B is, therefore, keen to pay 100 € for the
company.
The incumbent board reaches an agreement with C, according to which the
latter will launch a competing bid on A’s shares. C launches a “two-tier” bid,
where the “front-end” bid is launched for 5 shares at 12 €, i.e. at a price which
is higher than the price of the first bid, and the “back-end” price is much 
lower (6 €). The blended price of this competing takeover bid is therefore 9€,
which is lower than the price offered by the first offeror B. 
In this case, target shareholders face a heavy pressure to tender. If all share-
holders would tender to the first offer, they would earn the price P (10€),
which is higher than the blended price of the second offer (9 €); therefore,
shareholders would be better-off if they could cooperate deciding not to 
tender. But under an ex ante point of view, individual shareholders cannot 
be sure on what other shareholders will decide on the merit of the offer and
cannot coordinate cheaply; hence, under the viewpoint of a shareholder 
facing this dilemma, two alternatives are possible: (a) if the second offer fails
and the first offer succeeds, shareholders can tender to the first offer even 
if they tendered previously to the competing “two-tiered” bid; (b) on the
contrary, if the shareholder would tender to the first bid, but the second one
succeeds, shareholder gains only the lower “back-end” price of the second
bid (6 € in the example)27. Hence, a rational shareholder should tender to the
competing “two-tier” bid.
2. “Two-tier” vs. “two-tier”
What happens if the first hostile takeover-bid is “two-tiered”? Assume that
the bidder B launches a “two-tier” takeover bid on the 10 outstanding shares
of the company A shaped as follows: the “front-end” bid is launched for 
5 shares at 56 € a share and the “back-end” bid for the rest of the shares will
be launched at 50 €. The blended price is therefore 53 €. 
ECFR 4/2006 417White Knights and Black Knights
27 See SEC, “The economics of partial and two-tier tender offers”, Federal Securities Law
Reporter, 1984, n. 21, 926 (an empirical research of SEC on the years 1981 – 1983 did
not confirms this conclusion).
After this bid, the board of the target company seeks a third person, C, for
launching a competing tender offer. The competing bid launched by C is
“two-tiered” as the first bid, but is shaped in a different way: the “front-end”
bid is launched for 5 shares at 60 €, which is a higher price than the “front-end”
price of the first bid; the “back-end” price is 40 €, which is far lower than 
the “back-end” price of the first bid. The blended price of the second take-
over-bid is therefore 50 €.
Although the blended price of the competing offer is lower than the blended
price of the first offer, shareholders will rationally choose to tender to the
competing offer. The reason is that the difference between the “front-end”
price and the “back-end” price of the first offer is lower than the same 
difference in the second offer; hence the latter is more coercive than the 
former28. If the competing bid succeeds, shareholders who tendered to the
first bid risk to gain only the low “back-end” price of the competing bid (40 €
in our example); hence, the dominant strategy is to tender to the competing
bid, even if the blended price of the first bid is higher than the blended price
of the latter, and under an ex post point of view this is not the best possible
choice for shareholders 29. 
V. Law matters
1. A world with the mandatory bid rule
As we have seen in the second section, the EC Directive provides for a gene-
ral mandatory bid rule, according to which if a person purchases the control
of a company, she should then launch an offer for all the outstanding shares.
In this case, the payout of the competing game depends on the price which
should be paid for the mandatory bid. 
a) Mandatory bid at a price lower then the price paid for crossing 
the control threshold
The law could allow launching the mandatory bid at a price lower than the
price paid by the bidder for crossing the control threshold 30. Under a game
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28 Oesterle (n. 14) at p. 129, n. 49.
29 Bradley – Kim, “The evolution of the tender offer as a takeover devise: an analysis of
ownership structure, the free rider problem and the prisoner’s dilemma” unpublished
(1984) 293.
30 At the moment this is still the case in England (Rule 9.4 Takeover Code) and Italy 
(Article 106 (2) TUF).
theory analysis, this case is similar to the ones depicted in Section IV.2, where
a “two-tiered” hostile bid faces a defensive bid which is “two-tiered” as well. 
Indeed, the battle can be depicted as follows. The hostile bid launched by 
B on A’s shares is followed by a competing partial bid; both bids are condi-
tioned upon the fact that the majority of shareholders will tender. Whatever
bid will win, a mandatory bid at a lower price should be launched. Both 
partial bids, therefore, are comparable with “front-end” bids, and the follow-
ing mandatory bids are “back-end” bids at a lower price. 
The payout of this game depends on the formula used by the law for cal-
culating the price of the mandatory bid. We should remind what was stressed
above: the higher is the difference between “front-end” price and “back-end”
price, the more is a bid coercive; hence, the takeover-bid having the higher
spread between “front-end” and “back-end” price should win. Therefore, if
the difference between the prices of the hostile partial bid and its following
mandatory bid is lower than the spread for the competing bid, then the latter
is more coercive and should win. 
b) Mandatory bid at a the same price paid for gaining the control
On the contrary, if the price of the mandatory bid is equal to the highest price
paid for crossing the control-threshold, as under the general rule of the 
EC Directive 31, the payout of the competing situations described before is
different.
Assume that B launches a partial takeover bid for 6 shares at 12 €. The bid is
conditioned upon the fact that at least 6 shares are tendered. If this partial bid
succeeds it will be followed by a mandatory bid at the same price32; therefore,
the total price paid by B for the company A will be 120 €.
After the launch of the first partial bid, the board seeks a competing 100 %
all-cash takeover bid at 11 € per share; the total price which the competitor is
keen to pay is therefore 110 €. 
We should distinguish two cases.
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31 Article 5 (1). The Directive allows Member States to provide for exceptions to the 
general rule. The mandatory bid rule at the highest price paid by the bidder was 
followed even before the Directive in Belgium (Article 14 Arrete royal relatif aux offres
publiques d’acquisition et aux modifications du contrôle des sociétés, 1989), Germany
(§§ 3 et seq. WpÜG-Angebotsverordnung) and Hungary (§ 72 (1) (a) Act CXX/2001 on
capital market); Austrian law changed relating to this issue in order to comply with the
Directive: see the new § 26 Übernahmegesetz, as changed by the law 75/2006.
32 It could make sense to launch a partial bid, instead of a unique 100 % cash bid, because in
this way the bidder could finance easily the takeover in two steps; Enriques (n. 17) 446.
1) If the offer period of the competing bid does not need to be extended after
the bid succeeds, then if the competing bid succeeds shareholders who ten-
dered to the first bid, or held their shares, risk holding minority shares, which
they cannot tender to the competing bid anymore. If we assume that share-
holders are risk-adverse or risk-neutral, the dominant strategy for them,
therefore, is to tender to the second bid, even if its total price is lower than the
price of the first bid. 
Putting it in a more general way, in a world with a mandatory bid rule at the
same price paid for crossing the relevant threshold, a 100 % all-cash takeover
bid is more coercive then a partial bid, if the offer period of the competing bid
does not need to be extended after the bid succeeds 33. 
Nonetheless, the first bidder can win the takeover contest, if he only extends
his bid to all outstanding shares at 12 €, providing that the law allows the 
bidder to increase his offer, as will be stressed in the next pages. 
2) If the offer period of the competing bid should be extended after the bid
succeeds, the payout of the game is different. If the first hostile bid fails, ten-
dering shareholders can nonetheless sell their shares to the winning competing
offeror. Shareholders, therefore, can choose either bid, according to the value
attached to him; the first partial bid should prevail because the total price paid
for gaining the control is higher than the price offered by the competing bidder.
If this is the case, shareholders do not suffer any pressure to tender.
We should not forget that the mandatory bid rule at the highest price paid for
crossing the relevant threshold faces a significant drawback under the view-
point of social welfare. The rule is aimed at enhancing target’s shareholders’
wealth, but makes takeover-bids more expensive and, therefore, rare34. Under
an efficiency rule, we should compare the advantages in terms of efficiency
produced by the mandatory bid rule and the disadvantages of having fewer
takeover-bids on the market. 
2. Facilitating auctions on target’s shares
Law can mitigate the pressure to tender caused by competing tender offers,
allowing the first bidder to increase the price offered or to extend the offer to
all outstanding shares. Doing this, the first bidder can win the battle even if
the competing offer is coercive. 
420 ECFR 4/2006Federico M. Mucciarelli
33 Enriques (n. 17) 446.
34 Among other see Baum, “Funktionale Elemente und Komplementaritäten des briti-
schen Übernahmerechts”, RIW (2003) 421 et seq.; Burkart – Panunzi, “Mandatory
bids, squeeze-out, sell-out and the dynamics of the tender offer process”, ECGI 
Working paper series in law, n. 10, 2003, http://www.com/link/ECGI-Law.html.
This is realistic only if the law authorises shareholders who already tendered 
to the other offer to withdraw their acceptance and sell their shares to the 
first bidder, if the latter increased the price or extended the offer to a higher
number of shares35. 
Another legal device is necessary in order to treat the first bidder equal to its
competitor: the incumbent board should have a duty to provide to the hostile
bidder the same information he granted to the white knight. For instance, if
the competing bidder made a “due diligence” of the target company in order
to establish the right price, the same should be allowed to the first bidder,
which could eventually increase the offered price relying upon this new 
information36. Despite the fact that this equal treatment of competing bidders
is not expressly written in the wording of the directive, this rule stems from
the rationale of the “white knight exception”, which is to maximise share-
holder’s revenue through an auction on their shares, not to prefer a bidder
over another 37. 
If the law provides for these rules in order to place the hostile bidder and 
the competing bidder at the same footing, the former can increase the price
offered and can win the battle. 
Let us come back to the examples made before. In the first example, the 
first offeror (B) can win the battle against the coercive competing bid if he in-
creases the offered price reaching the “front-end” price of the competing bid,
that is, according to my example, 12 € instead of 10 €. In the second example,
B can win the battle extending the offer to all outstanding shares and increas-
ing the price till the “front-end” price of the competing bid. Nonetheless, we
should pay attention to the fact that the choice to extend the bid or to 
increase the price is financially not neutral for the first bidder, as he will 
probably suffer the cost of paying interests for borrowing the sum he needs;
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35 As is the case according to the takeover laws of most Member States: Austria (§ 17
ÜbG); Germany (§§ 22 WpÜG); Italy (Art. 40 (3) CONSOB Regulation); partially 
different is the regulation of the English City Code: shareholders can withdraw their
acceptance only if the offer was not yet declared as unconditional as to acceptance (Rule
34 City Code).
36 Fleischer “Konkurrenzangebote und due diligence”, ZIP (2002) 653; Hopt, “Über-
nahmen, Geheimhaltung und Interessenkonflikte. Probleme für Vorstände Aufsichts-
räte und Banken” ZGR (2002) 358.
37 Hirte, “Verteidigung gegen Übernahmeangebote und Rechtschutz des Aktionärs gegen
die Verteidigung“, ZGR (2002) 623, 640. See Rule 20.2 of the English takeover code
“Any information, including particulars of shareholders, given to one offeror or poten-
tial offeror must, on request, be given equally and promptly to another offeror or bona
fide potential offeror, even if that other offeror is less welcomed.”
we can expect that a certain, although unpredictable, amount of advantageous
bids would be defeated by coercive defensive bids, if the borrowing costs for
enhancing the offer are unsustainable for the first bidder. 
3. Drawbacks of the auctions
A regulation which allows the incumbent board to seek competing bids has a
significant drawback in terms of social welfare and efficiency. 
It should be stressed, indeed, that information is a valuable good which is not
freely available and, therefore, should be produced by any potential bidder.
The first offeror has probably borne high expenses in order to discover and 
to evaluate the possible target; investments made by the hostile bidder for 
discovering and evaluating a potential raider can be upheld only if the take-
over-bid succeeds. White knights, on the contrary, do not suffer any cost for
discovering and assess the target, being all information provided to them by
the incumbent board; hence, the white knight does not need to discount these
kind of costs and can offer a higher price. 
This outcome does not change even if the board has a duty to provide the 
hostile bidder with the same information given to the white knight, as this
duty does not help the first bidder to gain information for discovering and 
assessing a potential target.
We can make following simplified example. Assume that N is the cost suffered
by the first bidder (B) for discovering the target A; the expected value of 
the target after the bid succeeds is V1. The costs paid by B for the needed 
information should be rescued after the bid succeeds, hence the price (P) 
offered by B will discount these costs (P = V1 – N). The incumbent board
seeks a competing bid, transferring to him the information he needs for assess-
ing the target. Assume that the expected value of the target if the competing
bid succeeds (V2) is the same as if the hostile bid succeeds (that is to say 
V1 = V2). In other words, this is a so-called “common value auction”, where
all competing bidders attach the same value to the target; this is the case if 
takeover-bids are motivated by mismanagement of the incumbent board, not
by synergy gains, which would be different for each bidder38. The competing
bidder did not need to invest money for discovering and assessing the target,
hence the price he offers does not need to discount this kind of costs and can
be higher than the price offered by the hostile bidder (P2 = V1 = V2 > P). 
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38 Cramton – Schwartz “Using auction theory to inform takeover legislation” 7 JLEO
(1991) 29.
A regulation encouraging auctions on target’s shares and allowing the board
to seek a white knight, therefore, would discourage potential bidders to 
invest money for discovering targets and in this way risks to reduce the total
amount of takeover-bids on the market39. 
VI. Conclusions
The purpose of the present work was to address the question whether 
seeking a competing bid should be allowed to the incumbent board without
any limitation and without being approved by the general meeting. Despite a
common view arguing for the opposite, allowing the incumbent board to
seek for a competing bid without any restriction seems to be problematic. We
focussed our attention on two drawbacks of the “white knight exception”. 
On the one hand, competing bids could place a pressure to tender on targeted
shareholders, unless the applicable law provides for legal devices aimed at 
limiting collective action problems. This drawback is relevant under the policy
goal to maximise shareholders’ revenue in a specific takeover contest; if this
happens, the shares are not sold to the offeror who is keen to pay more for them
and we should consider this as an inefficient allocation of target’s ownership.
On the other hand, the “white knight exception” could represent a disincen-
tive for potential bidders to make investment in order to search and to asses a
target. This second drawback is significant under the policy goal to maximise
efficiency and social gain, but is not significant if the law is aimed only at 
maximising shareholders’ revenue in a specific takeover contest.
The EC Directive seems to endorse only the goal to maximise shareholders’
revenue; if we accept this, then the “white-knight exception” is coherent with
the policy goal of the Directive only if the competing bid is not coercive. The
reason is easy to be explained: if the competing bid sought by the board is 
coercive, this is not in the best interest of shareholders and the rationale 
underpinning the “white knight exception” fails 40.
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39 See Easterbrook – Fishel “The proper role of a target’s management in responding to 
a tender offer” 94 HLR (1981) 1161; Schwartz “Search theory and the tender offer 
auction” 2 JLEO (1986) 229; regarding the “white knight exception” see: Sàez La cave
“Una aproximacìon al derecho de las opas competidoras (a proposito de una reforma
reciente)” Rev. Derecho Bancario y Bursatil (2003) 33.
40 This is admitted also by Delaware case law; see Delaware Supreme Court Paramount
(n. 6) HN11 “Even in light of a valid threat, management actions that are coercive in
nature or force upon shareholders a management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer
may be struck down as unreasonable and nonproportionate responses”.
If a competing bid is coercive depends also on the applicable law, which can
mitigate or eliminate the “pressure to tender” through a mandatory bid rule
or allowing the first bidder to increase the offered price. 
The EC Directive partially harmonises only the mandatory bid rule. Accord-
ing to the general rule, the mandatory-bid should be launched at the highest
price paid for crossing the control threshold; this limits the pressure to tender
placed by competing bids, but makes takeover attempts more expensive.
Member States can relax the price rule, allowing mandatory bids at lower 
prices, but in doing this they could generate the preconditions of coercive
competing bids, according to the method used for establishing the price of
the mandatory bid. 
As we have seen, the law can hinder or mitigate the pressure to tender caused
by a competing bid, levelling the playing field among competing offers. Most
regulation of Member States provides for rules which place the first offeror at
the same footing with its competitor41; hence coercive competing bids should
be rare throughout the European Union. But we should also stress that the
EC directive does not harmonise rules on competing bids neither; hence the
applicable takeover law theoretically might still allow coercive defensive bids.
We should consider also that the EC Directive is to be applied only if the 
target company is both incorporated in a Member State and listed in a regu-
lated market of a Member State42. In all other cases, Member States are free to
hold their own conflict rules also for takeover law43, which usually refer to
the law of the country where the company is listed, being the regulation of
competing takeover-bids part of the market regulation, not of company
law44. 
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41 The bidder can increase its offer. Shareholders who already tendered to the other bid
can withdraw their acceptance.
42 Article 1 (1).
43 Siems, “The rules on conflict of laws in the European takeover directive”, ECFR (2004)
461; von Hein, “Zur Kodifikation des europäischen Übernahmekollisionsrecht” ZGR
(2005) 528 et seq.; Garcimartìn Alférez “Ofertas publicas de adquisicion de acciones:
problemas de ley aplicable”, Rev. Soc. (2006) 127.
44 I follow the traditional distinction between company law and capital market law, the
former being the law of the internal organisation of the corporation, and the latter the
(private or public) law of the exchange of shares; this issue can not be deepened in this
work; see Kübler, “Gesellschaftsrecht versus Kapitalmarktrecht – zwei Ansätze?”,
SZW (1995) 223 et seq.; Costi, “Il governo delle società quotate: tra ordinamento dei
mercati e diritto delle società”, Dir. Comm. Int. (1998) 65 et seq.; von Hein “Grund-
fragen der europäischen Übernahmekollisionsrecht” AG (2001) 219 et seq.
Let us assume that a company based in a Member State and listed only in a
non-EU market becomes the target of a takeover-bid45. The incumbent board
seeks for a white knight launching a competing-bid. To the competing bid
should be applied takeover law of the country where the target company is 
listed; let us imagine that the applicable law provides neither for a “mandatory
bid rule”, nor for any rule aimed at limiting the coercive effect of partial and
“two-tiered” bids. In this case, the incumbent board would be able to seek for
a coercive competing bid that would force shareholders to tender even if this
is not in their interests under an ex post viewpoint.
Under these circumstances, therefore, coercive defensive bids are still possi-
ble. Although the wording of the Directive does not distinguish coercive
competing bids from non coercive ones, courts could follow a teleological ap-
plication of Article 9 (1) and apply the “white knight exception” only to the
latter. Indeed, the rationale of the “white knight exception” is to allow the in-
cumbent board to enhance shareholders’ wealth, putting their shares up for
auction; seeking a coercive bid does not fit the ratio of the “white knight 
exception”, and the exception has no reason to be applied. 
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45 I assume for simplicity that the applicable law provides for the passivity rule and the
“white knight exception” even if the company is listed in a non-EU market.
